

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----043933 181356Z /47
O 181341Z MAR 78 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6893
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 08794

EXDIS

E.O. 11642: GDS
TAGS: PEPR PROG XF UN
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON USG PROPOSAL FOR SOUTH LEBANON

REF: (A) STATE 69250, (B) CAIRO 8654, (C) STATE 68560,
(D) STATE 69244

SUMMARY: BROUGHT KAMEL UP TO DATE ON SOUTH LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS AND SOUGHT GOE SUPPORT FOR OUT THREE-POINT RESOLUTION. KAMEL WAS NOT WELL BRIEFED ON STATE OF PLAY IN NEW YORK. HE MADE NO COMMITMENT, BUT SEEMED FAVORABLY INCLINED. HE INDICATED ABDEL MEGUID HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND ASSUMED USUN IN TOUCH WITH HIM. KAMEL VOICED TWO PRINCIPAL CONCERNS: (A) ISRAELIS SHOULD BE PRESSED TO WITHDRAW AT ONCE AND KILLING AND MAIMING IN SOUTH LEBANON SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END. (B) HE FEARED SOUTH LEBANON SITUATION LIKELY BE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF DISCUSSION IN UPCOMING BEGIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON WITH RESULT THAT SUCH CRITICAL ISSUES TO GOE AS APPLICABILITY OF WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242 TO WEST BANK/GAZA, PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND SETTLEMENTS WILL BE GIVEN SHORT SHRIFT. IF THIS HAPPENS, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR GOE TO KNOW HOW TO "STEER" PEACE PROCESS. I ASSURED HIM PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE SECRETARY ARE WELL AWARE OF GOE'S COM-
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PLAINT AND INTEND VIGOROUSLY TO PRESS THESE ISSUES AS WELL. END SUMMARY.

1. MET WITH FONMIN KAMEL TODAY TO BRING HIM UP TO DATE ON SOUTH LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS. HIS CHEF DE CABINET, AHMED MAHER, WAS PRESENT.

2. KAMEL CONFIRMED THAT MAHER HAD GIVEN HIM A FULL REPORT OF OUR TALK OF YESTERDAY RE U.S. STRATEGY AT UNSC (REF B). NEVERTHELESS, I WENT THROUGH THE POINTS AGAIN (ALSO USING REF A) TO BE SURE HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD. I NOTED WE ARE RECEIVING REPORTS THAT SOME ARAB STATES MAY BE THINKING OF HAVING TWO RESOLUTIONS, ONE COVERING INTEGRITY OF LEBANESE TERRITORY AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THE OTHER UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, ALL OF THESE POINTS SHOULD BE IN A SINGLE RESOLUTION. THIS WILL EASE THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT GOE WILL SUPPORT OUR THREE-POINT RESOLUTION WHEN IT COMES TO A VOTE. (AT TIME MY MEETING USUN 968, SUGGESTING WILLINGNESS GO ALONG WITH TWO RESOLUTION PACKAGE NOT YET RECEIVED.) I ALSO PROVIDED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS MAHER HAD RAISED (REF D).

3. KAMEL LISTENED CAREFULLY. HE DID NOT SEEM TO BE WELL BRIEFED ON STATE OF PLAY IN NEW YORK AND SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF IDEA OF SPLITTING THE RESOLUTION INTO TWO. WHILE HE MADE NO COMMITMENT, HE SEEMED TO FAVOR OUR THREE-POINT CONCEPT. AT ONE POINT HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SOONER THE LEBANESE CAN TAKE OVER SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOUTH LEBANON, THE BETTER. ANY HELP THAT CAN BE GIVEN THE LEBANESE ARMY TO UPGRADE ITS CAPABILITY, EITHER THROUGH U.S., UN OR ANY OTHER WAY, IS ALL TO THE
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GOOD. HE INDICATED THAT AMBASSADOR ABDEL MEGUID HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND SAID HE ASSUMED USUN IS IN TOUCH WITH ABDEL MEGUID. I ASSURED HIM THAT IT IS.

4. KAMEL MADE A SPECIFIC REQUEST THAT WE ADVISE HIM OF SOVIET POSITION AFTER TODAY'S DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS IN NEW YORK.

5. KAMEL HAD TWO PRINCIPAL CONCERNS ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION:

(A) ISRAELIS SHOULD BE PRESSED TO WITHDRAW AT ONCE AND THE KILLING AND MAIMING SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END. I TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE IN AGREEMENT AND DEPLORE KILLING, BUT NOTED PRESENT SITUATION IS SOMETHING OF A CHICKEN AND EGG AFFAIR. BOTH PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS REMAIN ENGAGED IN FIRING AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUED FIRING. KAMEL WAS IN NO DOUBT ON THIS SCORE: THE ISRAELIS ARE RESPONSIBLE, HE CONTENTED, SINCE THEY ARE THE INVADERS. IF THEY WITHDRAW AT ONCE, AS THEY SHOULD, FIGHTING WOULD STOP. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT UNLESS SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND TO POLICE SOUTH LEBANON AND

PREVENT PALESTINIAN GUERILLAS FROM RETURNING TO THE AREA,
IT WILL REMAIN A DANGER SPOT. THIS, AS I WAS SURE HE
APPRECIATED, IS THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF OUR IDEA OF A UN
PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

(B) KAMEL'S SECOND CONCERN WAS HOW PRESENT SITUATION

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 08794

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LIKELY AFFECT THE BEGIN VISIT. HE REMAINS WORRIED THAT
THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON WILL NOW
BE SOUTH LEBANON AND THAT SUCH CRITICAL ISSUES TO GOE
AS APPLICABILITY OF WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242 TO
WEST BANK/GAZA,
PALESTINIAN PROBLEM (ASWAN LANGUAGE) AND THE SETTLEMENTS
WILL BE GIVEN SHORT SHRIFT. IF THIS HAPPENS, HE SAID,
IT WILL BE BAD. IT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR GOE TO
KNOW HOW TO "STEER" THE PEACE PROCESS. I ASSURED KAMEL
THAT PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE SECRETARY ARE WELL AWARE OF
THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PEACE DISCUSSIONS
AND MAY BE EXPECTED VIGOROUSLY TO PRESS THESE AS WELL AS
TRYING TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE SOUTH LEBANON SITUATION.
I CAUTIONED HIM, HOWEVER, THAT AS A RESULT OF LAST
SATURDAY'S TERRORIST INCIDENT, BEGIN'S ALREADY TOUGH
POSITION ON WEST BANK/GAZA WITHDRAWAL AND THE PALESTINIAN
ENTITY IS LIKELY TO BE EVEN TOUGHER AND THAT THIS TIME
BEGIN PROBABLY HAS A NATIONAL CONSENSUS BEHIND HIM. HE
COULD BE SURE, NEVERTHELESS, THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST.
KAMEL SAID HE APPRECIATES OUR EFFORTS, BUT OPINED THAT
ONLY USG "PRESSURE" CAN PERSUADE BEGIN TO CHANGE HIS
VIEWS. WITHOUT SUCH A CHANGE, HE OPINED, THE PEACE
PROCESS IS FINISHED. EILTS

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